Rosneft, Russia’s state-backed oil giant, operates in a fiercely competitive energy landscape that spans the globe. From Middle Eastern national oil companies to Western supermajors and new energy pioneers, Rosneft faces rivals of immense scale and influence. These competitors range from traditional oil and gas titans to companies aggressively expanding into renewable energy.
Each brings unique strengths – whether vast reserves, technological edge, market dominance, or forward-looking green strategies – and each is navigating recent upheavals like sanctions, acquisitions, and the shift toward cleaner energy.
Below, we profile Rosneft’s top competitors, examining their size, market positioning, strengths, and recent developments, and how they stack up against Rosneft in the evolving energy arena.
Top Competitors and Alternatives of Rosneft
1. Saudi Aramco
Website – https://www.aramco.com/
Saudi Aramco, officially the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, is the world’s largest oil producer and one of Rosneft’s most formidable competitors. Aramco’s sheer scale
023, Aramco earned a staggering $121.3 billion in net income, making it the world’s most profitable company. The Saudi government owns about 81.5% of Aramco, relying on it as a primary revenue source.
By comparison, Rosneft is majority-owned by the Russian state and is a vital source of Russia’s budget, but Aramco’s financial firepower and low production costs give it a dominating edge.
Despite its traditional focus on crude oil, Aramco is not ignoring the energy transition. The company is investing in natural gas expansion and dabbling in renewables such as solar power and hydrogen. In fact, Aramco’s strategy includes developing 2.66 GW of solar projects with partners, and it plans to generate up to 12 GW of renewable energy by 2030 as part of Saudi Arabia’s national program.
These efforts, while modest relative to Aramco’s core business, signal a recognition that “oil and gas will be a key part of the global energy mix for many decades to come, alongside new energy solutions,” as CEO Amin Nasser noted.
Rosneft, in contrast, has made only limited forays into renewables, remaining heavily focused on oil production. Aramco’s market positioning – a state-backed behemoth with global reach – allows it to influence oil markets in ways Rosneft can only partly emulate.
Geopolitically, Aramco benefits from Saudi Arabia’s OPEC+ leadership, coordinating output cuts or increases that can affect Rosneft’s oil revenues indirectly. In summary, Saudi Aramco stands as a colossus in the industry, outpacing Rosneft on size and profits, while also cautiously exploring green energy to secure its long-term future.
2. ExxonMobil
Website – https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/
ExxonMobil is the largest privately-owned oil company and a key Rosneft competitor on the global stage. Based in the United States, ExxonMobil has a market-driven agility that contrasts with Rosneft’s state-driven mandate. In 2023, Exxon earned $36 billion in profits – lower than its 2022 record, but still a huge figure – and it made a blockbuster move to grow even bigger.
In October 2023, ExxonMobil agreed to acquire U.S. shale producer Pioneer Natural Resources in an all-stock deal valued at about $59.5 billion. This acquisition (Exxon’s largest since its 1999 merger) super-charges Exxon’s oil output in the Permian Basin, pushing its total production to record levels. By absorbing Pioneer’s rich shale assets, Exxon is doubling down on fossil fuels – a notable contrast to European rivals’ pivot to renewables.
Rosneft, for its part, has expanded through acquisitions in the past (such as buying TNK-BP in 2013), but Western sanctions now limit its growth options and partnerships. Notably, Exxon itself had been a partner with Rosneft in Russia’s Arctic (the Sakhalin-1 project) before exiting in 2022 due to sanctions over the Ukraine conflict. Exxon took a $4.6 billion write-down after pulling out of that joint venture with Rosneft. This withdrawal not only impacted Rosneft – which lost Exxon’s technical expertise – but also underscored how geopolitical tensions can reshuffle competitive dynamics.
Exxon refocused on prolific provinces like Guyana (where it leads a consortium finding billions of barrels offshore) and U.S. shale. By early 2024, Exxon was ramping up drilling in its core Permian and Guyana projects and even venturing into lithium mining to support electric vehicle batteries – indicating a toe-hold in the energy transition via battery minerals rather than wind or solar.
While ExxonMobil has been less aggressive than European majors in pursuing renewables, it invests in lower-carbon technologies like carbon capture and biofuels. It shares with Rosneft a belief in oil and gas longevity; however, Exxon’s investor-owned status means it faces pressure for high shareholder returns.
In 2023, Exxon rewarded investors with share buybacks and dividends, whereas Rosneft’s profits largely funnel to the Russian state or remain constrained by sanctions.
In sum, ExxonMobil’s strengths lie in its financial might, operational excellence, and now an enlarged resource base – making it a powerhouse competitor. Rosneft competes with Exxon in securing markets (e.g. selling crude to major importers) and in developing reserves, but Exxon’s global portfolio diversity and lack of sanctions exposure give it a strategic advantage.
3. Shell plc
Website – https://www.shell.com/
Shell, headquartered in the UK/Netherlands, is one of the world’s largest energy companies and a long-time peer competitor to Rosneft in oil and gas. However, Shell has been transforming itself into a broader “energy” company, with notable investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG), renewables, and electric mobility.
Shell is the world’s largest trader of LNG, a sector Rosneft has little presence in – highlighting a key difference in portfolio. While Rosneft primarily pumps crude, Shell has built a dominant position in natural gas, seeing it as a “critical role in the energy transition” by displacing coal.
In recent years, Shell made bold promises to cut carbon emissions and invest in green energy, but it has been tempering those ambitions. In 2023, under new CEO Wael Sawan, Shell announced a strategic shift: it will hold oil output steady (rather than decline) through 2030 and prioritize high-margin oil and gas projects, citing investor pressure for profits.
Shell even weakened its 2030 carbon reduction targets, lowering the planned cut in carbon intensity to 15–20% (from 20% prior) and scrapping a longer-term 2035 goal. This partial retreat mirrors a trend among European majors – BP made a similar move in 2023, scaling back its emissions-cut pledges amid soaring energy prices and security concerns.
Shell’s leadership argues this is pragmatism: the company insists it remains committed to net zero by 2050, but it is “focusing on higher-margin projects” and steady gas growth to balance returns and transition goals.
For Rosneft, Shell’s course is instructive. Rosneft has not made comparable climate pledges; its strategy is still to boost hydrocarbon output (e.g., its huge Vostok Oil project in the Arctic aims for 2 million barrels per day by 2030). Notably, Shell was a partner in some Russian projects (Sakhalin-2 LNG and Salym oil) but exited Russia after 2022, selling assets like its service stations to Lukoil and writing off investments. Those exits eliminated direct joint ventures with Rosneft, effectively turning Shell into a pure competitor rather than collaborator.
Shell’s strengths include a global refining and marketing network, chemicals, and a growing power business – areas where Rosneft is less internationally diversified (Rosneft’s downstream operations are largely within Russia or a few countries). Additionally, Shell is investing in offshore wind, solar farms, and EV charging infrastructure across Europe and Asia.
By comparison, Rosneft’s renewable initiatives are minimal, partly due to Russia’s less-diversified energy policy. As Shell tightens its focus on profitability and “value over volume,” it remains a formidable competitor with a broad energy toolkit.
Its recent strategic adjustments underscore a balancing act: delivering oil & gas profits today (an area where it competes with Rosneft for market share) while gradually building a low-carbon business for the future – something Rosneft has yet to seriously pursue.
4. BP
Website – https://www.bp.com/
BP (British Petroleum) has a unique history with Rosneft – once a close partner, it is now effectively a disengaged competitor. For nearly a decade, BP owned a 19.75% stake in Rosneft, gaining access to Russian reserves while providing Rosneft with global expertise. All that changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
BP announced it would exit its Rosneft shareholding, a decision that led to a massive write-down (up to $25 billion) and the resignation of BP’s directors from Rosneft’s board. However, fully severing ties proved complicated: as of late 2024, BP still formally held its Rosneft stake, unable to sell it due to lack of willing buyers amid sanctions. Rosneft’s CEO Igor Sechin quipped that BP remained a “shadow shareholder” despite BP’s statements about leaving. This awkward situation aside, BP’s overall strategy has evolved in ways that set it apart from Rosneft.
In 2020, under then-CEO Bernard Looney, BP declared it would cut oil and gas production by 40% by 2030 and aim for net-zero emissions by 2050 – one of the most aggressive transition plans in the industry.
But by 2023, pressured by investor concerns and high oil profits, BP dialed back its green ambitions. It reduced the 2030 output cut target to 25%, and in October 2024 BP scrapped the production cut target entirely, effectively abandoning the flagship goal in favor of new oil investments.
The new CEO, Murray Auchincloss, has shifted BP to a “simpler, more focused” path emphasizing oil, gas, and returns. This pivot includes seeking new oil projects in places like the Middle East and Gulf of Mexico. In other words, BP is moving back toward the fossil fuel core business, more in line with Rosneft’s direction, though BP still invests billions in renewables and low-carbon ventures.
It has sizeable offshore wind projects (in the US and UK), solar development via its Lightsource BP unit, and has expanded electric vehicle charging networks. But cost inflation and lower margins in renewables have tempered BP’s enthusiasm.
Comparatively, Rosneft has not needed to appease public shareholders or climate activists – its challenges are more about sanctions and finding export markets. One crucial difference now is market access: BP, unencumbered by sanctions on its own operations, can freely operate and make acquisitions globally.
Rosneft, under Western sanctions, cannot easily acquire foreign assets or advanced technology. This dynamic has, ironically, made BP more of a pure competitor after the split – both BP and Rosneft are vying to sell oil into Asia and other markets, especially as Europe turns away from Russian energy. Recent developments illustrate this: while Rosneft leans on countries like India and China to buy its crude, BP has inked new supply deals (including a five-year pact with Rosneft in 2023 to offtake refined products, showing they still find ways to cooperate commercially).
Overall, BP’s strength lies in its global portfolio and flexibility to invest across the energy spectrum. It is smaller in reserves than Rosneft, but nimbler internationally. As BP continues its “balanced” approach – neither fully traditional nor all-in green – it remains a significant competitor, especially in the race to reinvent what an integrated energy company should look like in the 2020s.
5. Chevron
Website – https://www.chevron.com/
Chevron, the second-largest U.S. oil company, is another heavyweight competitor, particularly in upstream (exploration and production). Like ExxonMobil, Chevron enjoyed windfall profits in 2022 and has been strategically using its financial muscle to grow.
In 2023, Chevron announced a $53 billion deal to acquire Hess Corporation, aiming to secure a prized foothold in Guyana’s massive offshore oil fields where Hess and Exxon have made huge discoveries. This move follows Chevron’s 2022 purchase of PDC Energy, bolstering its shale output. By integrating Hess, Chevron gains a share of an 11-billion-barrel oil trove in Guyana and diversifies its production base beyond its traditional strongholds.
For Rosneft, which lacks such international expansion opportunities due to sanctions, Chevron’s growing resource base underscores a competitive disadvantage: Rosneft is largely confined to developing Russian fields (like those in Eastern Siberia and the Arctic), whereas Chevron can acquire lucrative assets globally.
Operationally, Chevron is robust. In 2024 it produced 3.12 million barrels of oil equivalent per day, a company record and by contrast, Rosneft’s production has hovered around 4 million barrels per day of oil (pre-sanctions) including its assets – somewhat comparable in scale, but Rosneft’s customer base has shifted eastward due to embargoes.
Chevron’s Permian Basin operations are a major engine of growth, targeting 0.86 million barrels per day from West Texas shale. Chevron also leads big projects like Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field and has a global LNG business (with plants in Australia and interests in the U.S.). Rosneft is less exposed to LNG exports; the Russian company mainly exports crude and some refined products.
When it comes to green transition, Chevron has been relatively conservative. It invests in lower-carbon technologies such as renewable diesel (it co-owns ventures producing biofuels) and carbon capture, but unlike European rivals, Chevron has not set a net-zero 2050 ambition for its product emissions.
Its CEO Mike Wirth emphasizes that oil and gas will remain central for decades, aligning more with Rosneft’s stance than with, say, TotalEnergies. One area of divergence is shareholder returns: in 2023, Chevron returned a record $26.3 billion to shareholders via dividends and buybacks. It even raised its dividend 8% despite profits falling from the prior year. This focus on investor returns in the West contrasts with Rosneft’s situation, where cash is often reinvested or paid to the Russian state (and sanctions limit dividend flow to foreign minority owners like BP).
Recent geopolitical shifts have also played a role. Chevron had only minor exposure to Russia (unlike BP or Shell, it didn’t have large joint ventures there), so it was less impacted by the 2022 pullout of Western firms. In fact, Chevron benefited indirectly: as Russian oil was shunned by some, Chevron’s oil saw stronger demand, and its U.S. LNG helped replace Russian gas in Europe.
Overall, Chevron’s strengths are reliable production growth, financial discipline, and a focus on high-return projects. This makes it a formidable competitor to Rosneft, especially in supplying major oil importers.
As both companies largely double down on hydrocarbons (with measured steps into renewables for Chevron), they will continue to compete for global market share – but Chevron operates without the constraints hampering Rosneft, which could widen the competitive gap over time.
6. TotalEnergies
Website – https://totalenergies.com/
France’s TotalEnergies (formerly Total) provides a sharp contrast to Rosneft in strategy. It is among the world’s top oil and gas companies, but it has rebranded and reorganized itself as a “multi-energy” company, explicitly balancing an oil & gas legacy with a growing renewables and electricity business.
TotalEnergies still competes head-to-head with Rosneft in oil – it has upstream projects in the Middle East, Africa, and the Americas – yet it also aims to derive a significant portion of its revenue from clean energy within this decade.
In fact, TotalEnergies stands alone among majors with plans to shift about 20% of its business to renewable power by 2030. CEO Patrick Pouyanné has committed to a gradual transition: investing heavily in solar and wind assets globally, while continuing to develop oil, gas, and especially LNG (liquefied natural gas).
On the oil front, TotalEnergies remains formidable. It has stakes in giant oil fields (from Brazil’s deepwater to Uganda’s upcoming Lake Albert project) and is a partner in Iraq’s energy sector. Unlike Rosneft, which is largely confined to Russian territory, TotalEnergies has a geographically diverse portfolio.
One of its strengths is LNG – it is a top LNG player with projects in Qatar, the U.S., and Africa, positioning itself as a leader in natural gas supply (a role Rosneft does not play, since Russia’s gas exports are dominated by Gazprom). This focus paid off during Europe’s gas crisis: Total’s LNG business reaped huge profits in 2022–2023 by supplying gas to Europe as Russian pipeline flows dwindled. Concurrently, TotalEnergies has set ambitious targets for renewables: it’s investing billions to reach 100 GW of gross renewable generation capacity by 2030, spanning solar farms, wind (onshore and offshore), and battery storagemckinsey.com.
The company’s balanced approach can be seen in recent developments. Even as it pours money into renewables, TotalEnergies has not shied away from oil opportunities – it signed a landmark $27 billion deal with Iraq in 2023 to develop oil, gas, and solar projects together. It is also moving forward with controversial projects like the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (linking Ugandan oilfields to the coast) while pledging to cut methane emissions and eliminate routine flaring.
Compared to Rosneft, TotalEnergies is more exposed to Western investor expectations and climate activism; thus, it has aggressively publicized its net-zero 2050 pledge and interim climate goals. So far, it has not had the same public rollback of climate targets as BP or Shell – Pouyanné insists that maintaining both profitability and sustainability is a “no-regret strategy”.
Importantly, TotalEnergies had involvement in Russia too: it holds a minority stake in Novatek (Russia’s independent gas producer) and in Arctic LNG projects. Post-Ukraine war, TotalEnergies stopped new investments in Russia but controversially retained its stakes, arguing that pulling out would simply transfer value to others. This means TotalEnergies, unlike most Western peers, still has a toe in Russian energy – though not directly competing with Rosneft, since its stakes are in gas projects (Yamal LNG) and with Novatek.
Nonetheless, in the global context TotalEnergies and Rosneft vie for many of the same export markets. Total’s ability to offer customers a broader energy mix (including renewable power or LNG deals bundled with carbon offsets) could give it an edge as some buyers seek cleaner energy sources. For Rosneft, which offers mainly crude oil, the competitive challenge will grow as more customers and investors favor companies seen as part of the energy transition.
TotalEnergies exemplifies that dual identity – still an oil major with considerable strength, but also pivoting to be a leader in green energy, thereby occupying market space where Rosneft has little presence.
7. Sinopec
Website – https://www.sinopecgroup.com/group/en/
Sinopec (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation) is one of the largest energy companies on the planet by revenue – in some years even exceeding Aramco’s sales – and stands as a major regional competitor in Asia. Unlike Rosneft, which is primarily an upstream producer, Sinopec’s forte is downstream: refining and petrochemicals.
It runs an enormous network of refineries and chemical plants in China, giving it insight into oil demand and a degree of market power as a buyer of crude. In fact, Sinopec often acts as a purchaser of Rosneft’s oil; since Europe’s embargo, China has been a top destination for Russian Urals crude.
In that sense, Sinopec can be seen as both a customer and a competitor – it competes by leveraging its refining scale to negotiate favorable prices on crude (including Rosneft’s), and globally it vies in petrochemical markets where both companies operate (Rosneft has some petrochemicals business too).
By size, Sinopec is immense. It had roughly $440+ billion in revenues in recent years, putting it in the top ranks globally. Its oil production is smaller than Rosneft’s, but Sinopec’s integration means it also imports a lot of crude for processing.
One key area where Sinopec is emerging as a leader is hydrogen energy. The company is China’s largest hydrogen producer (mainly from fossil fuels historically) and is now pivoting to green hydrogen.
In 2023, Sinopec launched China’s first large-scale green hydrogen plant in Xinjiang, capable of producing 20,000 tons of hydrogen per year using solar-powered electrolysis. This hydrogen will be used to supply Sinopec’s refineries, replacing hydrogen made from natural gas. It’s part of Sinopec’s broader plan to incorporate cleaner energy – including building a 400 km hydrogen pipeline to Beijing – and echoes China’s national goal to reach 100,000+ tons of green hydrogen output by 2025. Rosneft, in contrast, has no notable hydrogen projects and remains focused on oil.
Sinopec is also investing in EV charging, biofuels, and renewable power for its operations. However, it still firmly relies on oil refining for profits.
Recent geopolitical developments have had mixed impacts: China has not sanctioned Russia, so Sinopec and Rosneft maintain a normal commercial relationship. In fact, Sinopec reportedly considered buying into some of Rosneft’s oil ventures when Western partners left (though the status of such deals is unclear).
Sinopec’s strength as a competitor lies in its home market dominance – it can influence Chinese oil import patterns – and in its deep pockets for strategic projects. If China’s government pushes decarbonization, Sinopec will be a vehicle to achieve those goals (unlike Rosneft, which operates in a country with less government impetus on decarbonization).
In summary, Sinopec represents the archetype of a modernizing oil company in a fast-growing market: still a colossal consumer and refiner of oil (and therefore a key competitor in securing that oil), but gradually steering its ship towards new energies like hydrogen. Rosneft must navigate this partnership-and-rivalry dynamic with Sinopec to sustain its access to the Chinese market, which is increasingly critical for Rosneft’s sales.
8. PetroChina/CNPC
Website – https://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/
Alongside Sinopec, Rosneft’s other Chinese competitor is CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and its publicly-listed arm PetroChina. CNPC is China’s main upstream oil and gas producer – effectively China’s equivalent of Rosneft in terms of state control and core business.
PetroChina produces around 4 million barrels of oil equivalent per day (including natural gas), putting it in the top tier globally, comparable to Rosneft’s scale. The company has vast oil and gas fields in China and has also ventured abroad, investing in projects from Iraq to Africa. This means Rosneft and CNPC sometimes compete for the same international opportunities (for instance, both eye oil blocks in resource-rich developing countries).
On the flip side, CNPC has partnered with Rosneft on certain deals – for example, CNPC took equity stakes in Rosneft projects in East Siberia and agreed to long-term oil supply contracts, strengthening China-Russia energy ties.
Where CNPC/PetroChina really stands out is in its balancing act between growth and emissions. China has set goals for its national champions: PetroChina aims to peak its carbon emissions by 2025 and achieve near-zero emissions by 2050.
To that end, PetroChina is actively investing in cleaner energy and new technologies. The company is pouring money into renewable energy projects – it invested billions of yuan in solar power, wind farms, geothermal projects, and even an electric utility acquisition to boost its green power capacity. PetroChina is also a partner in some high-profile carbon capture and storage (CCUS) initiatives; for instance, in 2023 it teamed up with BP to develop a CCUS cluster in China.
Such efforts show PetroChina’s strategy to remain a dominant energy supplier for China while aligning with the country’s climate objectives. Rosneft, in comparison, has not announced a clear emissions pathway or major investments in renewables – Russia’s climate targets are less stringent, and Rosneft’s focus stays on expanding oil and gas output (e.g., its Vostok Oil project aimed at tapping Arctic reserves).
One of CNPC’s strengths is government backing in a market with growing energy demand. China’s oil demand is still rising, and PetroChina/CNPC, along with Sinopec, have first claim to meeting that demand.
They also have financial might from the Chinese state and banks to execute long-term projects. For Rosneft, China has become a lifeline as Europe cut imports of Russian oil. CNPC’s midstream arm even co-built the pipelines that take Rosneft’s oil to China.
Thus, while CNPC is a “competitor” globally (for example, competing for oilfield licenses in the Middle East or Africa), it is also a crucial partner for Rosneft as a buyer and financier.
Looking ahead, CNPC’s aggressive move into renewables and alternative energy could eventually put it in competition with Western firms in those domains – something Rosneft is not positioned for yet.
Ultimately, CNPC/PetroChina’s trajectory exemplifies a national oil company trying to future-proof itself. It will continue to be a major oil producer (much like Rosneft) but is also preparing for a carbon-constrained future in a way Rosneft has not. The competitive implication is that PetroChina could evolve into a diversified energy giant with a broad portfolio, potentially outpacing peers that remain narrowly focused on oil.
9. Gazprom
Website – https://www.gazprom.com/
Gazprom, Russia’s state-controlled natural gas behemoth, might not seem a direct competitor to Rosneft at first glance – Gazprom’s main business is natural gas, whereas Rosneft’s is oil. However, within Russia’s energy sector, the two giants have long had overlapping interests and a rivalry for influence.
Gazprom has historically enjoyed a monopoly on Russian gas exports, which Rosneft has challenged by lobbying for rights to export gas or LNG. Moreover, on the global stage, both companies are pillars of Russia’s energy exports (one for gas, one for oil) and their fortunes affect the Russian state’s coffers. Recent geopolitical upheavals have dramatically shifted Gazprom’s position, indirectly impacting Rosneft’s competitive stance.
The war in Ukraine and subsequent European resolve to quit Russian energy hit Gazprom perhaps harder than any Russian company. Gazprom’s pipeline gas exports to Europe – once its largest market – have plummeted to a trickle. In 2021, Gazprom supplied over a third of Europe’s gas; by early 2025 its market share in the EU collapsed to just 7%. The EU pivoted to alternative suppliers and LNG imports, leaving Gazprom with an almost total loss of European markets.
As a result, Gazprom’s financial health has suffered: it posted a $7 billion net loss for 2023, its first annual loss this century, and is undergoing deep cost-cutting. The company even began selling off lavish assets (like its upscale offices in St. Petersburg) to save cash. Thousands of staff from its export division have been laid off as that business has become “just a shell” of its former self. In essence, Gazprom’s decades-long bet that Europe would remain dependent on Russian gas has been upended.
For Rosneft, Gazprom’s woes present a mixed picture.
On one hand, Rosneft also lost some European customers (e.g., Germany seized Rosneft’s stakes in German refineries in 2022 to secure supply). But oil, unlike pipeline gas, is easier to reroute to new buyers.
Rosneft successfully redirected much of its oil exports to Asia (notably China and India) once Europe imposed oil sanctions in late 2022. Gazprom’s product, however, is harder to reroute – its major new hope is China, via pipelines like Power of Siberia. Yet even the Russian government admits that gas exports to China cannot fully replace the volume and revenue of the lost European market. This has a knock-on effect: reduced gas export income strains Russia’s budget, potentially limiting state support or investment in Rosneft’s projects as well.
It also shifts the balance in Russia’s energy strategy – oil (Rosneft’s domain) now earns relatively more foreign currency than gas does. Internally, Rosneft might capitalize on Gazprom’s weakness by pushing for greater role in gas projects or LNG initiatives. For instance, Rosneft has long wanted to develop its huge Rupehold gas reserves and export LNG; with Gazprom reeling, Rosneft could gain more latitude domestically.
However, Gazprom remains a powerful competitor in a broader energy sense. It is still the world’s largest gas producer and controls massive reserves. If geopolitical conditions change (e.g., some future detente leading Europe to ease sanctions), Gazprom could rebound, potentially crowding Russian export capacity that Rosneft also uses (ports, pipelines, etc.).
Also, both companies vie for government attention and funding. Gazprom’s pivot to serving domestic needs – such as a mandate to gasify more Russian regions at low prices – shows it becoming more of a utility than a globe-trotter, whereas Rosneft is carrying the torch of Russia’s global energy ambitions (through oil).
In summary, Gazprom’s dramatic decline in Europe has indirectly elevated Rosneft’s importance for Russia’s export earnings. But it also highlights a cautionary tale: over-reliance on a particular market can be ruinous when geopolitics shift.
Rosneft is learning from this by diversifying its customer base in Asia. Going forward, Rosneft and Gazprom will continue a subdued rivalry – less about overlapping products and more about jockeying for influence and investment in a sanctioned economy.
If anything, Rosneft has gained a competitive edge as the healthier of Russia’s two energy giants in the post-2022 landscape, while Gazprom grapples with being “crippled” by Europe’s disengagement.
10. Lukoil
Website – https://www.lukoil.com/
Lukoil, Russia’s second-largest oil producer after Rosneft, is a key competitor in Rosneft’s home turf and in certain international markets. Unlike state-owned Rosneft, Lukoil is (nominally) privately owned, which historically made it more independent in decision-making and efficient in operations.
Prior to the Ukraine war, Lukoil pumped roughly 1.6–1.8 million barrels of oil per day, making it a significant player by global standards. It has upstream assets across Russia and a notable international footprint – Lukoil has operated oil fields in places like West Africa, Iraq, and Central Asia, and owned downstream assets in Europe (refineries and fuel stations).
This put Lukoil in direct competition with Rosneft in some regions, although Rosneft, with state backing, often had the upper hand in acquiring prime domestic assets (e.g., Rosneft took over big assets of Yukos in the 2000s and TNK-BP in 2013, deals out of Lukoil’s reach).
Recent developments have tested Lukoil’s resilience.
In April 2022, Lukoil’s long-time CEO and founder, Vagit Alekperov, resigned after he was hit by UK sanctions. His departure after nearly 30 years at the helm was reportedly to shield the company from being penalized for his personal status. Lukoil’s management change was symbolic: it showed how Western sanctions indirectly pressured even non-state Russian companies.
Notably, Lukoil took a different public stance than Rosneft on the war – its board was one of the few in Russia to call for a speedy resolution to the conflict in 2022, signaling disapproval. Perhaps as a result, Lukoil managed to avoid the toughest Western sanctions (it was never sanctioned as a company by the EU, for instance) and continued some operations in Europe longer than Rosneft did.
For example, Lukoil’s Italian refinery in Sicily kept running by using non-Russian oil when sanctions hit, until it was eventually sold to new owners in 2023. Lukoil also owned a large refinery in Burgas, Bulgaria, which it is now planning to sell for around $2 billion, likely due to the changing business climate in Europe. These sales indicate Lukoil retrenching from Europe as the sanctions net tightens, similar to Rosneft’s assets in Germany being taken over by the government.
Within Russia, Lukoil’s competitive position relative to Rosneft has often been that of the agile underdog. It prides itself on operational efficiency and cost control. But Rosneft, with political clout, has sometimes edged out Lukoil in acquiring licenses and mergers.
A case in point: when Yukos assets were auctioned in 2004–2007, Lukoil was largely shut out while Rosneft scooped up the prize fields.
Today, Lukoil remains a crucial contributor to Russia’s oil output and exports, but it must navigate the state-dominated industry carefully. The company’s strategy has been to maintain output, invest in new fields in Siberia and the Caspian region, and expand petrochemical projects. It also continues to supply Lukoil-branded petrol stations in 20+ countries (though some Western units have been sold or rebranded post-2022).
In the context of renewables and transition, Lukoil, much like Rosneft, has made only tentative steps (small investments in solar plants in Russia, for example). Its edge, if any, comes from being less entangled in political strategies – Lukoil can be more profit-driven in selecting projects.
Yet, the flip side is that in an era of geopolitical strain, not being state-owned offers limited protection; ultimately, all Russian oil firms are affected by sanctions and government dictates (such as OPEC+ coordinated production cuts).
Going forward, Lukoil’s competition with Rosneft will likely remain centered on the Russian upstream: vying for licenses, talent, and government favor to develop new fields. Internationally, both will focus on retaining market share in friendly countries. Lukoil’s more discreet global profile could help it fly under the radar in some markets compared to the more high-profile Rosneft.
Nonetheless, as of 2025, Rosneft’s scale (about 2.5 times Lukoil’s output) and state backing give it a dominant position that Lukoil can challenge only in niche ways. Lukoil will continue to be a major competitor at home, ensuring Rosneft cannot monopolize the Russian oil industry, and its adaptive strategies could allow it to survive the sanctions era as a leaner, perhaps more internationally diversified company.
Conclusion
The competitive landscape for Rosneft spans an array of energy giants, each with different strengths and strategic directions. We’ve seen how state-owned players like Saudi Aramco and China’s CNPC leverage state support to secure massive production and are cautiously steering into renewables, while Western private majors like ExxonMobil and Chevron double down on oil through mega-acquisitions even as they nod to lower-carbon initiatives. European companies such as Shell, BP, and TotalEnergies present yet another model: they have one foot in traditional oil and one in the green economy – though recent course corrections show they are balancing ambition with realism (or investor pressure). Rosneft’s regional rivals like Gazprom and Lukoil illustrate the challenges of operating under geopolitical strain, with Gazprom’s dramatic fall serving as a warning and Lukoil’s resilience offering a contrast to state-run approaches.
For Rosneft, navigating this environment means contending with rivals on multiple fronts: the oil market remains its primary battlefield, where production volumes, export markets, and cost efficiency are key.
Here, Rosneft must outlast OPEC heavyweights and agile U.S. shale producers alike. At the same time, the long-term shift toward cleaner energy looms – a space where many of Rosneft’s competitors are staking early claims. While Rosneft has been slow to pivot, the company’s future competitiveness may depend on how it responds to the green transition that its peers are increasingly embracing.
In the meantime, Rosneft’s story is one of a company leveraging political ties and rich reserves to stay in the game, even as sanctions bite and the ground beneath the energy industry slowly shifts. Its top competitors, profiled above, collectively paint a picture of an industry in flux: giants old and new, some reinventing themselves, others doubling down on core strengths, all vying for position in a world where energy security, profitability, and sustainability must be reconciled.
The race is on, and Rosneft’s ability to hold its own against this diverse set of competitors will shape its brand story in the years to come.
Also Read: Who are the Top Competitors and Alternatives of Aramco?
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